America’s Staying Power: Why the U.S. Is Likely to Lead Economically and Militarily for the Foreseeable Future

What Rivals Still Can’t Match: Capital Markets, Tech, and Global Reach

Every few years, someone declares the United States “in decline.” The line is familiar: too divided, too indebted, too dysfunctional—meanwhile “someone else” is supposedly rising into the driver’s seat.

But power isn’t a mood. It’s a system. And the U.S. system—messy, loud, self-correcting, and often infuriating—still has the deepest economic flywheel and the widest military reach on Earth.

“Foreseeable future” isn’t forever. It means the next decade or two, absent a self-inflicted catastrophe. Over that horizon, the basic math still favors the United States.

What follows is the case for why.

1) Economic leadership: it’s not one advantage—it’s a stack

Economic dominance isn’t just GDP. It’s currency, capital markets, innovation throughput, energy resilience, and the ability to attract talent. The U.S. remains unusually strong across all of them at once.

Start with size. By IMF estimates, the U.S. remains the world’s largest economy in nominal terms.

But size alone isn’t the point. The point is that America’s economic weight sits on top of infrastructure that makes global commerce prefer U.S. rails—even when people complain about the ticket price.

2) The dollar is still the world’s operating system

If you want the shortest explanation for why the U.S. keeps pole position: the dollar is still the default language of global finance.

The Federal Reserve’s 2025 review shows the U.S. dollar comprised about 58% of disclosed global official foreign reserves in 2024—far ahead of the euro and miles ahead of China’s renminbi.  The IMF’s COFER updates show similar territory for the dollar share in allocated reserves.

That matters because reserve currency status is not a trophy. It’s a pipeline:

• global trade and commodity pricing
• cross-border borrowing
• banking settlement
• safe-asset parking for institutions
• crisis “flight to safety” behavior

And the “safe asset” at the center is still U.S. Treasurys.

The New York Fed notes the U.S. Treasury market is the largest securities market in the world, with nearly $30 trillion in marketable debt outstanding (as of late September 2025).  Pew’s explainer also underscores the sheer scale of Treasurys outstanding in 2025.

You don’t replace a system like that quickly. Not with speeches. Not with hashtags. Not even with bilateral currency deals. You replace it with an alternative that is:

• open, liquid, transparent
• backed by deep markets and credible institutions
• supported by rule-of-law confidence
• usable at scale without political strings

China’s currency, for example, remains a minor reserve component in COFER—around ~2% territory.

That’s not “because everyone loves America.” It’s because the alternatives don’t solve the same problem with the same reliability.

3) Capital markets: the U.S. doesn’t just make money—it finances the world

America’s edge isn’t merely that it has companies. It has the world’s most powerful machine for funding companies.

When global investors want:

• massive equity liquidity
• deep corporate bond markets
• venture capital ecosystems
• scalable exits (IPOs, acquisitions)

they still gravitate to the U.S. financial ecosystem.

That capital-market gravity shows up in international investment patterns. UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2025 notes the U.S. remains both a top source and top destination for foreign direct investment.

This matters for “foreseeable future” leadership because funding capacity is how you turn ideas into dominance—especially in frontier areas like AI, biotech, aerospace, and defense tech.

4) Innovation capacity: the U.S. turns R&D into deployable power

A country can be smart and still fail to translate science into economic advantage. The U.S. has decades of practice converting research into companies, platforms, and strategic technologies.

NSF data shows the United States performed an estimated $940 billion in R&D in 2023 across sectors (up from 2022).  Earlier NSF comparisons also place the U.S. at the top tier of global R&D performance.

On the public side, the federal system still funds substantial R&D inside government facilities and federally funded R&D centers.  And DoD-related budget materials and public strategy documents emphasize continuing investment in modernization and AI-related adoption.

Why does this connect to leadership? Because modern dominance is increasingly “technology compounding.” The nation that builds:

• compute infrastructure
• advanced chips ecosystems
• AI deployment capability
• resilient supply chains
• dual-use innovation pipelines

tends to win both economically and militarily.

Even near-term productivity data has started to reflect this dynamic. U.S. productivity surged in Q3 2025 per BLS reporting covered by Reuters, with commentary linking part of the business investment cycle to AI and tech adoption (with appropriate caution about attributing causality too early).

Whether AI is the whole story or not, the bigger point stands: the U.S. is where new general-purpose technologies get funded, scaled, and weaponized (commercially and militarily) faster than most competitors.

5) Energy: America is unusually hard to strangle

A huge historical weakness for great powers has been energy vulnerability. The U.S. has moved in the opposite direction.

EIA reporting highlights record U.S. crude oil production levels in 2024, reinforcing America’s position as a top crude oil producer and a major energy producer overall.

This doesn’t mean energy is “solved” forever. It means the U.S. has strategic breathing room many rivals don’t. Energy abundance cushions shocks, supports industrial capacity, and reduces the leverage of hostile suppliers.

6) Demography: America’s “advantage” is optional—but powerful if used well

Demographics are destiny only if you refuse to adapt. The U.S. has a lever most rich countries lack: immigration.

That said, recent projections suggest slower U.S. population growth under restrictive immigration conditions and low fertility trends. Coverage of new CBO projections emphasizes how immigration levels strongly influence long-run labor force dynamics and population trajectory.

Here’s the key: slower growth is a risk, but it’s also a policy choice. The U.S. can tighten or loosen that valve. Many competitors can’t.

Meanwhile, key rivals face worsening demographic headwinds. Reuters reported China’s population fell for a third consecutive year (data for 2024), reflecting long-term aging pressures.  UN population-prospects materials similarly emphasize major aging and population shifts globally.

If the U.S. manages immigration intelligently (legal, skills-aligned, assimilation-focused) while keeping domestic workforce participation strong, it retains a medium-term advantage in labor dynamism—even if the trendline isn’t as rosy as it was decades ago.

7) The alliance economy: America is the hub, not a solo act

Another underappreciated fact: U.S. power is amplified by allies.

When you look at America plus key partners (NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and close security/economic allies), you’re not comparing one nation to one nation. You’re comparing a network to a network.

NATO’s own defense expenditure reporting shows the alliance’s scale and the ongoing push to meet higher spending commitments (with 2024–2025 figures included as estimates).  NATO also notes a newer commitment framework discussed at the 2025 summit in The Hague, outlining longer-term spending targets.

Alliances are not charity. They’re force multipliers. Bases, logistics, intelligence sharing, interoperability, and standardization turn U.S. power from “big” into “everywhere.”

Which brings us to the military side.

8) Military leadership: the U.S. is still the only true global power-projection force

Lots of countries can defend their neighborhood. Very few can project power across oceans, sustain it, and integrate it with space, cyber, intelligence, logistics, and industrial replenishment.

The U.S. can.

SIPRI reports U.S. military expenditure reached about $997 billion in 2024—by far the largest in the world, and a major share of global spending.

Money isn’t everything. But at this scale, it buys persistent advantages:

• global lift and logistics
• carrier strike capacity
• ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) depth
• precision munitions integration
• training, readiness, and command structure
• nuclear triad modernization priorities (explicitly emphasized in DoD budget communications)

And then there’s the physical footprint. Congressional Research Service reporting on U.S. overseas basing identifies a large set of persistent bases and other sites across regions—real infrastructure for global presence.

That matters because war and deterrence are logistics problems before they are heroism problems.

9) Naval reality: carriers, yes—shipbuilding, watch this

America’s naval power is still unmatched in carrier aviation. CRS notes the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carrier force includes 11 nuclear-powered carriers and references statutory requirements around maintaining that level.

But here’s the honest caveat: shipbuilding is a real pressure point. China’s commercial shipbuilding dominance has direct military implications because of dual-use industrial capacity.

CSIS analysis argues China has built a dominant position in shipbuilding, raising national security concerns.  Coverage of the CSIS findings highlights how extreme the gap has become, including discussion of China’s share and the minimal U.S. share in global commercial shipbuilding.

This is one of the few areas where a competitor’s industrial scale could compress America’s margin over time—especially in a protracted conflict scenario. The right takeaway isn’t “panic.” It’s “rebuild capacity.”

If the U.S. takes shipbuilding seriously—workforce, yards, procurement discipline, and allied coordination—this becomes a solvable problem rather than a fatal one.

10) The defense industrial base: America still dominates the high end

Beyond government spending, the U.S. retains massive private-sector defense capacity and engineering depth.

SIPRI’s Top 100 arms producers reporting shows U.S.-headquartered companies account for a very large share of total Top 100 arms revenues, with U.S. firms totaling $334 billion in 2024 (constant dollars) per the SIPRI fact sheet.

That’s not simply “profit.” It’s production capability, supply chains, and a deep bench of primes and subcontractors—imperfect, sometimes slow, but still the deepest ecosystem on Earth for advanced defense systems.

11) Why competitors can’t replace the U.S. soon

China is the most serious long-term competitor. It has scale, industrial policy, and a growing military. But it also has constraints that make “replace the U.S.” far harder than “be a major power.”

Three big constraints stand out:

• Demographics: China’s population decline and aging trend is a slow-moving economic drag.
• Currency: the renminbi remains marginal in global reserves, limiting financial-system pull.
• Trust and transparency: capital prefers predictable rules; heavy political control creates an enduring discount.

Russia remains dangerous militarily (especially nuclear) but is not positioned to lead the world economically. The EU remains wealthy and technologically capable but politically fragmented and aging, and its defense posture still leans heavily on U.S. support inside NATO’s architecture.

India has enormous promise, but “promise” isn’t “dominance.” It takes time to build infrastructure, raise per-capita productivity, and develop the institutional and industrial depth that turns population scale into sustained leadership.

So, yes: the world is multipolar in friction, conflict, and competition. But “multipolar” does not automatically mean “America loses.”

12) The biggest threats are self-inflicted

If you want the strongest argument against continued U.S. leadership, you don’t point to Beijing or Moscow. You point inward.

Three self-inflicted risks matter most:

• Fiscal complacency: A nation can be rich and still weaken itself by treating debt like a party trick. (The U.S. can carry high debt longer than others because of the dollar and Treasurys—but “longer” isn’t “forever.”)
• Political dysfunction: prolonged institutional paralysis corrodes the very advantages that make the U.S. resilient—innovation, investment confidence, talent attraction.
• Industrial neglect: shipbuilding is the clearest example, but it’s broader—critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, grid modernization, and supply-chain redundancy.

The good news is that these are choice-driven problems. The U.S. has repeatedly shown an ability to correct after excess—usually later than it should, but still in time.

13) So what does “foreseeable future” look like?

In practical terms, over the next 10–20 years, the U.S. is likely to remain:

• the largest single economic engine (especially in nominal terms)
• the issuer of the dominant reserve currency
• the center of the deepest capital markets and the primary safe-asset system
• the top-tier innovation platform in high-impact technologies
• the only country with truly global military power projection at scale

That doesn’t mean the U.S. wins every news cycle. It doesn’t mean it never loses regional influence or fights. It means the underlying structure still makes America the default leader—unless it chooses not to be.

Why This Matters

If you’re a business owner, investor, student, or just a normal person trying to plan your life, U.S. leadership shapes the environment you’re operating in:

• The dollar-based system affects inflation, interest rates, and global stability.
• U.S. innovation ecosystems tend to set the pace for technologies that reshape industries.
• U.S. security commitments influence trade routes, energy markets, and the risk of major war.

The practical takeaway: betting on America’s collapse is usually a bad business model. Betting on America’s ability to adapt—while demanding it fix its obvious weaknesses—is historically the smarter wager.

Disclaimer:
The views expressed in this post are opinions of the author for educational and commentary purposes only. They are not statements of fact about any individual or organization, and should not be construed as legal, medical, or financial advice. References to public figures and institutions are based on publicly available sources cited in the article. Any resemblance beyond these references is coincidental.

References

International Monetary Fund. (2025). World Economic Outlook (October 2025): GDP, current prices—United States.

International Monetary Fund. (2025). COFER data brief and updates on currency composition of reserves.

Bertaut, C. (2025). The international role of the U.S. dollar—2025 edition. Federal Reserve Board (FEDS Notes).

Federal Reserve Bank of New York. (2025). How has Treasury market liquidity fared in 2025?

Pew Research Center. (2025). What to know about the bond market.

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2025). Trends in world military expenditure, 2024 (fact sheet).

Congressional Research Service. (2025). Navy Ford (CVN-78) class aircraft carrier program: Background and issues for Congress.

Congressional Research Service. (2025). U.S. overseas basing: Background and issues for Congress.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2025). U.S. crude oil production and energy production record reporting (Today in Energy).

National Science Foundation, NCSES. (2024–2025). Discovery: U.S. and global R&D; Trends in U.S. R&D performance and funding.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2025). World Investment Report 2025.

NATO. (2025). Defence expenditure of NATO countries (2014–2025) and related commitment summaries.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2025). Analyses on China’s shipbuilding dominance and dual-use shipbuilding empire.

Reuters. (2025–2026). Reporting on U.S. productivity and China population trends.